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.BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
academy went out of existence. The Surrogate's Court and the
Appellate Division 82 held that the trust terminated when the
academy was closed. The Court of Appeals, (quoting the prin-
ciple stated in the first paragraph) reversed the lower courts
solely on the matter of construction saying that testator intended
that the trust be perpetually used for the education of the poor,
with the additional expression of a mere preference that they be
educated at the academy.83 They therefore concluded that the
trust survived the existence of the academy.
XI. ToRTs
Emergency Doctrine
In the determination of negligent conduct, the fact that the
actor is confronted with a sudden emergency, not caused by his
own tortious conduct, which requires instant decision is a factor
in an appraisal of the reasonable character of his choice of ac-
tion.1 The fact that the emergency is created by the actor's own
conduct does not prevent the rule from being applicable if his
conduct is not tortious.2
In Meyer v. Whisnant,3 the Court of Appeals upheld a dis-
missal of complaints against a host motorist as a matter of law
where it appeared that a "sudden, unanticipated, and unex-
plained" movement of a westbound auto into the path of the east-
bound host motorist's vehicle rendered him the helpless victim
of an emergency for which he was not responsible. The fact that
defendant motorist was guilty of a violation of the traffic law4
was insufficient to subject him to tort liability in the absence of
a showing of logical connection between the violation and the acci-
dent.
A dissenting opinion by Judge Conway, concurred in by Chief
Judge Lewis and Judge Froessel, denied the availability of the
doctrine to defendant, and stated that plaintiffs had made out a
82. Throughout the long clause testator referred to children, and to the education
of children, on thirteen different occasions. The academy was mentioned five times.83. The court placed emphasis on the fact that children were mentioned thirteen
times and the academy only five times.
1. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 796.
2. Id. § 796, comment (a).
3. 307 N. Y. 369, 121 N.E. 2d 372 (1934).
4. VEHIcLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 81 (26). "The driver of a vehicle when upon a
highway outside of a business or residential area shall use the traffic lane at the extreme
right except when passing a vehicle, pedestrian, animal or substantial object in such
lane." In the instant case, defendant was driving in the left lane of two eastbound lanes
at the time of the accident.
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prima facie case requiring a jury verdict.' It was pointed out
that the issue of negligence and causation originally had been left
to the jury by the trial court on a proper charge,6 and thus a
reversal on the law by the Appellate Division of a verdict against
defendant was unwarranted. On this basis, the ease should be
remanded for a new trial.
Without denying or underestimating the potential strength
of the "emergency doctrine" in New York, or its relative merits
and/or infirmities, its application by the majority in the instant
case appears doubtful.
Liability of the State to Users of Highvways
By provision of the Court of Claims Act,7 the State, when the
negligence of its officers and employees acting in their official
capacity results in the infliction of personal injuries, effects a
waiver of immunity from, and assumption of liability, consents to
have its liability determined in accordance with rules of law ap-
plicable to individuals, and submits to the jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims to hear and determine claims of liability.8 By this legis-
lation, that which was once an unenforcible moral obligation has
been transformed into an actionable legal right, the rule of
respondeat superior being applicable to the State.
In a proceeding against the State, Canepa v. State,' the facts
indicated that a state highway had been recently altered, re-
paired, and a sharp rising curve constructed in order to facilitate
an approach to an overhead crossing. Before alteration, the road
had been fairly straight. Two ordinary reflectorized "slow" signs
had been placed at the east and west approaches respectively.
The car involved in the accident failed to pass safely around the
5. See REsTATEMENT, Tomrs § 286. "The violation of a legislative enactment by
doing a prohibited act . . ., makes the actor liable for an invasion of another . . . if
(d) the violation is the legal cause of the invasion . . .. " See also 5 A.M. Jua.,
Automobiles § 171. Where the situation of peril arises because of the driver's own
negligence, the emergency rule cannot be invoked in his behalf. Sterling v. Senchack,
252 App. Div. 894, 300 N. Y. Supp. 297 (2d Dep't 1937).
A charge that violation of Vehicle & Traffic Law § 81 (15) (carrying more
than three adult persons in the front seat of a non-commercial vehicle) was prima facie
evidence of negligence, but its probative force might be overcome by proof that the
violation was not the proximate cause of the accident, was proper.
• 6. See Sterling v. Senchack, supra note 7; Wood v. Pergament, 267 App. Div.
875, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 433 (2d Dep't 1944).
7. Couxr oF Craims Acr § 8.
8. Jackson v. State, 261 N. Y. 134, 184 N. E. 135 (1933). See also, Smith v.
State, 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920), which suggested that § 12 (a) (now §8)
be written into law, the court being of the opinion that in the absence of this specific
statutory enactment the immunity of the State as to its liability had not been hitherto
waived by the then Court of Claims Act, (L. 1920, c. 922 § 12).
9. 306 N.Y. 212, 117 N. E. 2d 550 (1954).
